Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game
Joëlle Noailly (),
Jeroen van den Bergh and
No 2005.78, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
Keywords: Common property; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Global interactions; Local interactions; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-evo and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.78
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