Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players

Jean-Christophe Pereau, Alejandro Caparros and Tarik Tazdaït

No 2005.95, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.

Keywords: Strategic bargaining; Non-monolithic players; Scission; Noncooperative game-theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.95

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