Bargaining Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic Choices? An Empirical Assessment
Fabrizio De Filippis (),
Valeria Costantini (),
Riccardo Crescenzi and
Luca Salvatici ()
No 2005.99, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the detection of possible “defectors”, i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.
Keywords: Agricultural trade negotiations; Bargaining coalitions; WTO; Cluster analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 Q17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-int and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Bargaining coalitions in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round: similarity of interests or strategic choices? An empirical assessment (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.99
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