When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

Raphäel Soubeyran
Additional contact information
Raphäel Soubeyran: GREQAM

No 2006.91, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.

Keywords: Political Cycles; Inertia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2006-091.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.91

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).