Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

Erik Ansink and Arjan Ruijs
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Arjan Ruijs: Wageningen University

No 2007.16, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.

Keywords: Water Allocation; Stability; Climate Change; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements (2008)
Working Paper: Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.16

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