Environmental Taxation and International Eco-Industries

Joan Canton ()

No 2007.26, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Environmental policies are discussed when two countries differ in their ability to abate pollution. Northern eco-industries (the industry supplying abatement activities) are more efficient than Southern ones. Segmented environmental markets and a Northern monopoly yield identical second-best taxes in both countries. When markets are global, Southern countries underestimate the market power of eco-industries. Introducing competition creates positive (resp. negative) rent-shifting distortions in South (resp. North). Cooperation could reduce Northern pollution but has ambiguous consequences in South.

Keywords: Eco-Industry; Strategic Environmental Policy; Asymmetric Oligopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 F12 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.26

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