Repeated Games Played in a Network

Markus Kinateder

No 2008.22, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Keywords: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Network; Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated Games Played in a Network (2008)
Working Paper: Repeated Games Played in a Network (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.22

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