Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level

Benno Torgler and Bin Dong
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Benno Torgler: Queensland University of Technology
Bin Dong: Queensland University of Technology

No 2008.39, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependent variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies, presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level. The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that political interest has an impact on corruption controlling for a large number of factors.

Keywords: Corruption; Political Interest; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J24 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.39

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