Networks with Group Counterproposals

Ricardo Nieva

No 2008.61, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.

Keywords: Efficiency; Bargaining Protocol; Counterproposals; Network Formation; Transfers; Externalities; Groups; Coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2008-061.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Networks with Group Counterproposals (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.61

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).