Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard
Raphael Soubeyran () and
Elodie Rouviere ()
No 2008.7, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.
Keywords: Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 H41 I18 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-com and nep-ent
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.7
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