Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

Raphael Soubeyran and Elodie Rouviere ()

No 2008.7, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

Keywords: Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 I18 L11 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-com and nep-ent
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2008-007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.7

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).