Is There any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies?
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (),
Nicola Acocella and
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Wilfried Pauwels: University of Antwerp
No 2009.154, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we also discuss in an informal way possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.
Keywords: Social pacts; Axiomatic bargaining; Unions; Issue linkage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 E58 E61 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.154
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