Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Michele Moretto and Cesare Dosi
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Cesare Dosi: University of Padova

No 2009.23, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.

Keywords: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D92 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.23

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