Connections Among Farsighted Agents

Vincent Vannetelbosch, Gilles Grandjean and Ana Mauleon

No 2009.30, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.

Keywords: Farsighted Players; Stability; Efficiency; Connections Model; Buyerseller Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C70 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Connections Among Farsighted Agents (2011)
Working Paper: Connections among farsighted agents (2011)
Working Paper: Connections Among Farsighted Agents (2009)
Working Paper: Connections among farsighted agents (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.30

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