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Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms

Rahmi İlkılıç

No 2009.32, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.

Keywords: Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D85 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.32

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