The Future of Securities Regulation

Luigi Zingales

No 2009.7, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: The U.S. system of security law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors’ trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality securities, in the new millennium, investors’ perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a series of reforms that center around corporate governance, while shifting the focus from the protection of unsophisticated investors in the purchasing of new securities issues to the investment in mutual funds, pension funds, and other forms of asset management.

Keywords: U.S. Security Law; Securities Regulation; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G2 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Future of Securities Regulation (2009)
Working Paper: The Future of Securities Regulation (2009)
Working Paper: The Future of Securities Regulation (2009)
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