On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources

Georgios Kossioris, Michael Plexousakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Aart de Zeeuw
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Georgios Kossioris: Department of Mathematics, University of Crete
Michael Plexousakis: Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Crete

No 2010.101, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.

Keywords: Differential Games; non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria; Ecosystems; Optimal State-dependent Tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-res
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources (2011)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources (2010)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.101

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