The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network

Markus Kinateder

No 2010.120, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.

Keywords: Repeated Game; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Network; Strategic Communication; Centrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.120

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