Group Bargaining and Conflict

Nicolas Querou

No 2010.125, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative statics that highlight the influence of changes in the internal composition of groups and in their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements.

Keywords: Bargaining; Conflict; Agency Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/ndl2010-125.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Group Bargaining and Conflict (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.125

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).