The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors

Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet

No 2010.144, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare.

Keywords: Risk Regulation; Monitoring; Capture; Integration; Separation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cta
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors (2010)
Working Paper: The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors (2010)
Working Paper: The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors (2010)
Working Paper: The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors (2010)
Working Paper: The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors (2009)
Working Paper: The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.144

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