Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network

Lionel Richefort and Patrick Point
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Patrick Point: Research Group on Theoretical and Applied Economics (GREThA),University of Bordeaux 4 – CNRS

No 2010.147, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).

Keywords: Common-pool Resource; Digraph; Cycle; Independent Set; Empirical Example (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.147

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