Social Capital and Political Accountability

Tommaso Nannicini, Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini and Ugo antonio Troiano

No 2010.58, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: In this paper, we empirically investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share norms of generalized morality demand higher standards of behavior on their elected representavtives, are more willing to bear the cost of acquiring information, and are more likely to base their vote on criteria of social welfare rather than (narrow) personal interest. We take this conjecture to the data using information on the Italian members of Parliament in the postwar period (1948–2001). The empirical evidence shows that the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger in electoral districts with high social capital, where social capital is measured by blood donation, and political misbehavior refers to receiving a request of criminal prosecution or shirking in parliamentary activity. Accordingly, episodes of political misbehavior are less frequent in electoral districts with high social capital.

Keywords: Social Capital; Culture; Political Agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap, nep-ltv, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social Capital and Political Accountability (2013)
Working Paper: Social Capital and Political Accountability (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.58

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