A Theory of Firm Decline

Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas Cooley and Sonia Di Giannatal
Additional contact information
Sonia Di Giannatal: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas

No 2010.88, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained–efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment.

Keywords: Principal Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Survival; Firm Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 D92 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-ent and nep-sbm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2010-088.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Firm Decline (2010)
Working Paper: A Theory of Firm Decline (2010)
Working Paper: A Theory of Firm Decline (2010)
Working Paper: A Theory of Firm Decline (2009)
Working Paper: A Theory of Firm Decline (2008)
Working Paper: A Theory of Firm Decline (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.88

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).