International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation

Walid Marrouch () and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

No 2011.35, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements on emission reductions. Moreover, we show that the more effective the adaptive measure in terms of reducing the marginal damage from emissions, the larger the stable size of the international environmental agreement. In addition, we show that larger coalitions, in the presence of adaptation, may lead to lower global emission levels and higher welfare.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Adaptation; Coalition Formation; Climate Change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q54 Q59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation (2011)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation (2011)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation (2011)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.35

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