Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Giovanni Mastrobuoni (giovanni.mastrobuoni@carloalberto.org) and Paolo Pinotti

No 2011.53, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We estimate the causal effect of immigrants' legal status on criminal behavior exploiting exogenous variation in migration restrictions across nationalities driven by the last round of the European Union enlargement. Unique individual-level data on a collective clemency bill enacted in Italy five months before the enlargement allow us to compare the post-release criminal record of inmates from new EU member countries with a control group of pardoned inmates from candidate EU member countries. Difference-in-differences in the probability of re-arrest between the two groups before and after the enlargement show that obtaining legal status lowers the recidivism of economically motivated offenders, but only in areas that provide relatively better labor market opportunities to legal immigrants. We provide a search-theoretic model of criminal behavior that is consistent with these results.

Keywords: Immigration; Crime; Legal Status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 F22 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.53

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