Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites

Anders Akerman, Anna Larsson and Alireza Naghavi
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Anna Larsson: Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Seim

No 2011.65, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Data on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a political economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences of the country’s political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production owned by the political elites differ across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime. We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a decision to open up to trade and an inflow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are crucial for success upon globalization.

Keywords: Autocracy; Growth; Political Elites; Landowners; Capitalists; Growth Miracles; Trade; Comparative Advantage; Capital Mobility; Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F20 O10 O24 P14 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-pol and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
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