Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies

Vasiliki Manousi and Anastasios Xepapadeas
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Vasiliki Manousi: Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business

No 2013.41, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We couple a spatially homogeneous energy balance climate model with an economic growth model which incorporates two potential policies against climate change: mitigation, which is the traditional policy, and geoengineering. We analyze the optimal policy mix of geoengineering and mitigation in both a cooperative and a noncooperative framework, in which we study open loop and feedback solutions. Our results suggests that greenhouse gas accumulation is relatively higher when geoengineering policies are undertaken, and that at noncooperative solutions incentives for geoengineering are relative stronger. A disruption of geoengineering efforts at a steady state will cause an upward jump in global temperature.

Keywords: Climate Change; Mitigation; Geoengineering; Cooperation; Differential Game; Open Loop - Feedback Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies (2013)
Working Paper: Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.41

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