The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse

Adam N. Walker, Hans-Peter Weikard and Andries Richter
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Adam N. Walker: Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Andries Richter: Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands and Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Synthesis (CEES), The Department of Biosciences, University of Oslo

No 2015.60, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and find that Grand Coalitions can be stable for any number of players if free-riding results in a total depletion of the fish stock. The results thus show conditions under which a Great Fish War becomes a Great Fish Pact. However, this conclusion no longer holds upon dropping the standard assumption that payoffs are evaluated in steady states. If payoffs in the transition between steady states are included, the increased incentives to deviate offset the increased benefits from cooperation due to the presence of endogenous risk and the Great Fish Pact returns to being a Great Fish War.

Keywords: Coalition Stability; Dynamic Games; Endogenous Risk; Fish Stock Collapse; Fish War; Renewable Resource Exploitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse (2015)
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