Municipal Waste Collection: Market Competition and the EU Policy

Carlo Reggiani and Francesco Silvestri
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Francesco Silvestri: Department of Economics and Management, University of Ferrara

No 2015.90, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: Two of the main pillars of the EU waste collection policy are the Proximity Principle and Self-Sufficiency Principle. According to those, waste should be disposed as close as possible to where it has been produced. The effect of such provision is to increase the market power of local disposers, with possible undesirable consequences for other firms in the vertical chain. We show through a simple spatial model that one effect of the Proximity Principle and Self-Sufficiency Principle is to provide an incentive to collectors and waste producers to increase the amount of separated waste.

Keywords: EU Municipal Waste Policy; Self-Sufficiency Principle; Proximity Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L44 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Municipal Waste Collection: Market Competition and the EU Policy (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.90

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