Increasing Anti-Malaria Bednet Uptake Using Information and Distribution Strategies: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Senegal
Jacopo Bonan,
Philippe LeMay-Boucher and
Michel Tenikue (michel.tenikue@liser.lu)
Additional contact information
Philippe LeMay-Boucher: Heriot-Watt University
No 2016.69, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Abstract:
We evaluate the effects of different marketing and distribution techniques on the purchase of Long-Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITN). Using a randomized controlled trial in urban Senegal, we look at the impacts of receiving information on malaria-related issues and of different sale treatments. We find that overall information has no significant effect on the demand for LL-ITNs, but has a significant effect on individuals who have never attended school and have poor knowledge of malaria. Receiving an offer to purchase an LL-ITN with a voucher valid for 7 days increases purchases by 23 percentage points, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer.
Keywords: Malaria; Senegal; Randomized Experiment; Bednets; Distribution Campaign (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 I12 I15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
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Related works:
Working Paper: Increasing Anti-Malaria Bednet Uptake Using Information and Distribution Strategies: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Senegal (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2016.69
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