Matching in the Kolm Triangle: Interiority and Participation Constraints of Matching Equilibria
Richard Cornes and
Dirk Rübbelke ()
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Wolfgang Buchholz: University of Regensburg and CESifo Munich
Richard Cornes: Australian National University
No 2019.12, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on the one hand, for which income distributions interior matching equilibria result and, on the other hand, for which income distributions the agents voluntarily participate in a matching mechanism. As a novel result, we especially show that the “participation zone” is larger than the “interiority zone”.
Keywords: Public Goods; Matching; Pareto Optimality; Kolm Triangle; Aggregative Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Matching in the Kolm Triangle: Interiority and Participation Constraints of Matching Equilibria (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2019.12
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