Influential News and Policy-making

Federico Vaccari

No 2022.40, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper analyzes the implications of those types of interventions that affect misreporting costs. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by the two candidates. I show that higher costs may lead to more misreporting and persuasion, whereas low costs result in full revelation. Yet, interventions that increase misreporting costs never directly harm the voter, but those that do so slightly can be wasteful of public resources. Regulation produced by politicians leads to suboptimal interventions.

Keywords: Fake news; Misreporting; Media; Policy-making; Regulation; Disinformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Influential news and policy-making (2023)
Working Paper: Influential News and Policy-making (2022)
Working Paper: Influential News and Policy-making (2021)
Working Paper: Influential News and Policy-making (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2022.40

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