Career concerns: a human capital perspective
Braz Camargo () and
Elena Pastorino ()
No 288, Textos para discussão from FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil)
We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning by doing, in a life cycle model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition a ects implicit incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career concerns literature can be reversed in the presence of human capital accumulation. Namely, implicit incentives need not decrease over time and may decrease with the degree of uncertainty about an individual's talent. Furthermore, increasing the pre-cision of output measurement can weaken rather than strengthen implicit incentives. Overall, our results contribute to shed new light on the ability of markets to discipline moral hazard in the absence of explicit contracts linking pay to performance.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-dge and nep-hrm
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Working Paper: Career Concerns: A Human Capital Perspective (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:eesptd:288
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