A model of the rule of law

Bernardo Guimaraes and Kevin Sheedy

No 378, Textos para discussão from FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil)

Abstract: Economic development requires some limits on what those in power can do | the rule of law | but how can restraints be imposed on the powerful when there is no-one above them? This paper studies equilibrium rules allocating power and resources established by selfinterested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo, and thus want to defend it.

Date: 2015-03-16
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:eesptd:378

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