Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

Flavio Menezes and Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

No 364, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

Date: 2000-01-26
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Journal Article: Why do Bidders Drop Out from a Sequential Auction (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:epgewp:364

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