Money with Bank Networks

Ricardo Cavalcanti and Henrique Dezemone Forno

No 545, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: We allow banks to choose between two networks in a simple version of the Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) model of inside money. Members of a network have access to credit but must redeem banknotes issued by other members in random meetings. We find equilibria in which members of a particular network issue more valuable notes, but face the same ex-ante payoff as that of their competition . Banks are shown to be concerned with both credit externalities and with monetary liabilities. When the size of the bank sector is small, these two opposing forces may result in a stable equilibrium.

Date: 2004-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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