A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED

Daniel Gottlieb (), Humberto Moreira () and Aloisio Araujo

No 553, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more signal.

Date: 2004-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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