Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

Elvia Mureb Sallum, Fernando Barbosa and Alexandre Cunha

No 578, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.

Date: 2005-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Chapter: Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation Under Rational Expectations (2017)
Journal Article: Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:epgewp:578

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