Non-emptiness of the alpha-core

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Nicholas C. Yannelis

No 716, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: We prove non-emptiness of the alpha-core for balanced games with non-ordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991) and Kajii (1992). In particular we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the non-emptiness results to models with infinite dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied while our non-emptiness result applies.

Date: 2011-05-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Nonemptiness of the alpha-core (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:epgewp:716

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