Another hidden cost of incentives: the detrimental effect on norm enforcement

Andreas Fuster and Stephan Meier

No 09-2, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: Monetary incentives are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of monetary incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how monetary incentives interact with punishment and how this in turn affects contributions. Our main findings are that free riders are punished less harshly in the treatment with incentives, and as a consequence, average contributions to the public good are no higher than without incentives. This finding ties to and extends previous research on settings in which monetary incentives may fail to have the desired effect.

Keywords: Human behavior; Social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Related works:
Journal Article: Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement (2010)
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