The Outlook for the Economy and Monetary Policy: Low-Frequency Policymaking in a High-Frequency World
No 69, Speech from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Good afternoon. I thank Ellen Zentner and the New York Association for Business Economics for the invitation to speak to you today. I believe that one of the important responsibilities of a Federal Reserve policymaker is to share his or her economic perspectives with the public. Congress has wisely given the Fed independence in making monetary policy decisions in pursuit of our statutory goals of price stability and maximum employment. I say \\"wisely\\" because a body of research and practical experience both here and abroad show that when central banks formulate monetary policy free from short-run political interference, the policy is more effective and yields better economic outcomes. But to preserve that independence, the central bank must be held accountable for its policy decisions. And a key component of that accountability involves policymakers providing information to the public on their evaluation of economic conditions, their outlook for the economy, and the rationale for their decisions.
Keywords: independence; central banks; Monetary Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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