Designing stabilization policy in a monetary union

Russell Cooper and Hubert Kempf ()

No 1, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: The European Monetary Union (EMU) has become a reality, but economists nonetheless continue to debate the desirability and the optimal design of a monetary union. Since a union's essential element is delegation of monetary power to a single centralized entity, one of the key issues in this debate is whether a monetary union will limit the effectiveness of stabilization policy. If so, it will not necessarily be welfare-improving. Having studied a two-country world economy and considered various designs of monetary union, the authors argue that the success of monetary union depends on 1) the commitment ability of the single central bank; 2) the policy flexibility of national fiscal authorities and the central monetary authority; and 3) the cross-country correlation of shocks.

Date: 2000
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn, nep-mon and nep-pub
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Related works:
Working Paper: Designing Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union (2000)
Working Paper: Designing Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union (2000)
Working Paper: Designing Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0001

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-200001

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