Information and voting power in the proxy process

Sanjai Bhagat and Richard H. Jefferis

No 9011, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: We document shareholder support for wealth-decreasing changes in corporate governance in the form of antitakeover charter amendments. the enactment of these amendments is shown to be related to ownership structure. This gives rise to a sample selection bias that contaminates traditional event-study results and explains the discrepancy between our findings and those reported in previous studies. We also provide evidence that strategic behavior by managers plays a role in the adoption of these amendments.

Keywords: Stockholders; Consolidation and merger of corporations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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