Principal-agent problems in commercial-bank failure decisions

Asli Demirguc-Kunt

No 9106, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: The author develops a model that examines the regulator's role in the bank failure decision process, with attention given to the regulator's constraints and incentives.

Keywords: Bank; failures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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