Troubled savings and loan institutions: voluntary restructuring under insolvency

Ramon Degennaro, Larry Lang and James Thomson

No 9112, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: Regulatory agencies are unwilling or unable to close thrift institutions immediately upon insolvency. Instead, they have progressively reduced the thrift capital requirement, refrained from enforcing that requirement, and allowed thrifts to hold more nonmortgage loans in the hope that the industry would recover. According to this study, only 13 percent of the largest 300 firms eventually recovered between the end of 1979 and the end of 1989. When the thrift crisis surfaced in the early 1980s, the firms that ultimately recovered operated in a fashion similar to those that eventually failed. But in the mid-1980s, recovered thrifts pursued a risk-minimizing strategy, while nonrecovered thrifts pursued a risky, high-growth strategy. We find no evidence that managers of unsuccessful firms consumed more perquisites than their successful counterparts.

Keywords: Savings; and; loan; associations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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