Exclusion in all-pay auctions

Ian Gale and Mark Stegeman

No 9401, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: A description of a procedure for increasing the seller's expected revenue in an all-pay auction, specifically in the case of lobbying, where a politician is typically assumed to award the political prize to the highest bidder.

Keywords: Political; science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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