Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale

No 9402, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: An analysis of the impact of binding budget constraints on the expected revenue generated by sealed-bid and oral auctions, showing that revenue is higher in the former case.

Keywords: Competition; Small business (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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