Non-par banking: competition and monopoly in markets for payments services
Edward J. Stevens
No 9817, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Once the Federal Reserve Banks started providing par interbank funds transfers, their check collection service was unnecessary to bring nationwide par check collection in competitive banking markets. The survival of non-par banks probably reflected the absence of competition in the markets where they operated. The empirical evidence is consistent with this conclusion, since non-par banks typically were monopolists in isolated rural markets for banking services.
Keywords: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.); Bank competition; Payment systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998, Revised 1998
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