Limited enforcement and the organization of production

Erwan Quintin ()

No 601, Center for Latin America Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Abstract: This paper describes a dynamic, general equilibrium model designed to assess whether contractual imperfections in the form of limited enforcement can account for international differences in the organization of production. In the model, limited enforcement constrains some agents to operate establishments below their optimal scale. As a result, economies where contracts are enforced more efficiently tend to be richer and emphasize large scale production. Calibrated simulations of the model reveal that these effects can be large and account for a sizeable part of the observed differences in the size distribution of manufacturing establishments between Mexico and the United States. ; Economic Research Working Paper 0109

Keywords: International trade; Manufactures; Maquiladora (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/7140/item/646658 Full text

Related works:
Journal Article: Limited enforcement and the organization of production (2008)
Working Paper: Limited enforcement and the organization of production (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:feddcl:0601

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Latin America Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Amy Chapman ().