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Optimal contracts for independent central bankers: private information, performance measures and reappointment

Carl Walsh ()

No 93-02, Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Keywords: New Zealand; Banks and banking, Central; Monetary policy - New Zealand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993, Revised 1993
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Journal Article: Optimal contracts for independent central bankers: private information, performance measures and reappointment (1993)
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