The role of private placement debt issues in corporate finance
Willard T. Carleton and
No 95-13, Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Private placement debt issues are more effective than public bonds in resolving information asymmetries and controlling moral hazard problems. Firms that issue only private placements (non-switchers) are found to have more information problems than firms that have access to the public bond market (switchers), and therefore are required to pay more for their private placements. Moreover, switchers switch to private placements when the financing situation involves material information asymmetry that is unsuitable for issuing public bonds. For general purposes financing, switchers switch to private placements when the issue size is small, apparently to minimize transaction costs.
Keywords: Debt; Corporations - Finance; Securities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995, Revised 1995
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